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''Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts'', 557 U.S. 305 (2009), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that it was a violation of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation for a prosecutor to submit a chemical drug test report without the testimony of the person who performed the test.〔following the reasoning of ''Crawford v. Washington'', 541 U.S. 36 (2004).〕 While the court ruled that the then-common practice〔''See generally'', ''Amicus'' Brief for the Thirty-Five States and DC〕 of submitting these reports without testimony was unconstitutional, it also held that so called "notice-and-demand" statutes are constitutional. A state would not violate the Constitution through a "notice-and-demand" statute by both putting the defendant on notice that the prosecution would submit a chemical drug test report without the testimony of the scientist and also giving the defendant sufficient time to raise an objection.〔''Citing per e.g.'' Ga. Code Ann. §35–3–154.1(2006)(); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 38.41, §4 (Vernon2005)(); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2925.51(C) (West 2006)().〕 == Background == In 2001, Boston police received information from an informant regarding suspicious activity at a Kmart store. The informant stated that an employee repeatedly received phone calls at work, after which he would leave the store, get into a blue sedan, and return a few minutes later. Police set up surveillance and witnessed this activity occur. Police detained and searched the employee finding four clear plastic bags containing a white powder substance, alleged to be cocaine. Police detained and searched the passengers of the blue sedan including Luis Melendez-Diaz, then transported them to police headquarters in a police car. During the trip, police observed the arrestees fidgeting and making furtive movements. Upon arrival at the station, police searched the interior of the police car and found 19 smaller plastic bags containing a white powder, again alleged to be cocaine. In accordance with Massachusetts law, police submitted all alleged contraband for chemical testing. Melendez-Diaz was charged with distribution and drug trafficking of cocaine in an amount between 14 and 28 grams under the Massachusetts Controlled Substances Act,〔(Ch. 94C, §§32A, 32E(b)(1) )〕 a felony punishable by not less than three years imprisonment. At trial, the prosecution placed into evidence the bags seized from the police car. It also submitted three "certificates of analysis" or affidavits showing the results of the forensic analysis performed on samples of the seized white powder. The affidavits reported the weight of the seized bags and claimed the substance found was cocaine. The affidavits were sworn before a notary public in accordance with Massachusetts law.〔(Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 111, §13 )〕 Melendez-Diaz objected to their admission asserting that the Supreme Court decision in ''Crawford v. Washington'' required the forensic analyst to testify in person. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the affidavits as ''prima facie'' evidence of the positive presence of narcotics. A jury trial found Melendez-Diaz guilty. He appealed, contending ''inter alia'' that the admission of the affidavits violated his Sixth Amendment right to be confronted by those witnesses who would testify against him. The Massachusetts Appeals Court rejected the claim under Massachusetts precedent which held that admission of these affidavits did not violate the Confrontation clause.〔''See, Commonwealth v. Verde'', 444 Mass. 279, 283–285, 827 N. E. 2d 701, 705–706 (2005).〕 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts denied review.〔449 Mass. 1113, 874 N. E. 2d 407 (2007).〕 Melendez-Diaz then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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